# X-BD-001 SD-JWT VC Binding

This binding describes how Open Asset Evidence claims are serialised, signed and selectively disclosed as [SD-JWT VC](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-19) credentials. Claim meaning belongs to the profile that defines the claim. Carrier conformance is a separate target from conformance to an asset, condition or valuation profile.

## Issuance and presentation

The issuer's signing service takes profile claims, issuer keys and a status reference and produces a credential. A holder presents it; a verifier parses and checks the presentation. The issuer chooses which claims can be selectively disclosed. A holder cannot later hide a cleartext signed claim by deleting it.

Use the [Evidence Presentation and Disclosure](evidence-presentation-and-disclosure.md) rules for credential selection, claim disclosure and relationship checks. [SD-JWT](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9901.html) handles disclosure within a credential. It does not prove that a selected package is complete or that separately issued credentials have the relationship claimed by a manifest.

A property valuation uses `vct` to identify its credential type. Making the amount and basis selectively disclosable is a possible profile design, not a capability demonstrated by the current reference prototype: that prototype supports selective disclosure only for `address_text`. Full granular disclosure remains implementation work. If an asset reference is cleartext, every presentation exposes it; if a future profile makes it disclosable, withholding it can make asset binding unverifiable. Neither choice removes the need for recipient policy and privacy design.

## Pinned specifications

The draft binding targets:

- [SD-JWT, RFC 9901](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9901.html).
- [SD-JWT VC, draft-ietf-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-19](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-19).
- [Token Status List, draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-21](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-21).

Use these explicit versions and review upgrades separately. Preserve wire identifiers such as `vct` values exactly when display names or documentation codes change. No [OpenID4VC](https://openid.net/sg/openid4vc/) or [HAIP](https://openid.net/specs/openid4vc-high-assurance-interoperability-profile-1_0.html) alignment is established by this binding.

## Verification limits

The draft requires the verifier to apply the recipient's accepted binding, algorithms, credential types and key-resolution policy. A header's `alg`, `typ` or key reference is input to validate, not permission to select an arbitrary verification method. A credential-supplied JWKS address, embedded key or `x5c` certificate chain does not establish issuer identity by itself; the key must be authenticated through an accepted source or trust anchor. These are requirements, not a claim about every demonstration implementation. See [Verifier behaviour](../security/verifier-behaviour.md).

Type metadata does not establish issuer authority. Check authority under the recipient's named [trust policy](policy/trust-list.md), and apply the [common profile](common-asset-evidence-profile.md) rules for identifiers, time and status. A signature authenticates a statement; it does not establish the truth of an observation, legal effect or institutional acceptance.

The binding has prototype self-tests. End-to-end signature, key-control, audience, nonce, status and adversarial vectors against the pinned versions remain incomplete. The [Verification Result Contract](verification-result-contract.md) checker validates consistency of reported results rather than credential signatures. Its tests therefore do not establish working interoperability for this binding.
