# V-PC-001 Property Valuation Credential

A valuer signs a market-value opinion of GBP 350,000 for Lender A, effective 14 September 2026. The credential identifies the property, the professional source, the engagement, the inspection date and the valuation report. It may also reference a separately signed [Property Condition Credential (C-PC-001)](../condition/property-condition-credential.md).

## What is a Verifiable Credential?

A Verifiable Credential (VC) is a machine-readable set of claims made by an issuer, protected so that a recipient can check its provenance and detect alteration. In this case the claims express a professional opinion of value about an identified property. The property is the subject of the valuation; the holder is the party that stores or presents the credential.

Cryptographic verification establishes what was signed and under which key. Issuer authority, the accuracy of the underlying evidence, permitted use and a lender's acceptance require separate checks. A signature does not turn an opinion into a guaranteed fact. This page uses the issuer-holder-verifier concepts; its selected carrier is the draft SD-JWT VC binding, not a claim of conformance to the W3C JSON-LD data model. [^1][^2]

<div class="rw-video"><iframe src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/Uqklk0v-C5I?start=183" title="YouTube video" loading="lazy" allow="accelerometer; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture" allowfullscreen></iframe></div>

## Three different meanings of status

| Concept | Meaning for this page |
| --- | --- |
| Specification status | The **:3** credential type and its claims schema are draft. Issuance is **NOT_OFFERED**, pending legal review. A valid fixture is not a released service. |
| Status of an instance | A particular signed credential has status, validity and lifecycle evidence checked at time of use. A current status response does not make the valuation or inspection recent. |
| Recipient acceptance | The recipient decides whether this evidence is suitable for its purpose, policy and engagement. Technical success does not grant reliance, PI cover or lending approval. |

## Scope

V-PC-001 describes one signed valuation statement: its participants, fields, carrier, links and lifecycle. [V-PP-001 Property Valuation Profile](property-valuation-profile.md) requires one such credential (MUST) and defines how the evidence is composed. This page focuses on the credential itself.

> **Draft identifiers**
>
> Credential type: `urn:realworld:credential:property-valuation:3`\
> Claims schema: `urn:realworld:schema:property-valuation-claims:3.0.0-draft.2`\
> These identifiers are preserved exactly. The namespace is unregistered; no uniqueness claim is made.

## Participants and responsibility

The professional author, technical signing service, holder and recipient can be different organisations. Passing a credential between systems does not transfer the valuer's professional responsibility.

| Participant | Responsibility and boundary |
| --- | --- |
| Valuer or valuation firm | Produces the opinion, agrees the engagement and takes responsibility within its professional remit. Applicable authorisation depends on jurisdiction and recipient policy. Professional duties and reliance terms exist outside the credential. |
| Technical signing or delivery service | Serialises and signs claims on the issuer's behalf and delivers the credential. A service hosting the key or transporting the data does not thereby become the professional author. |
| Condition observer / inspection firm | Issues a separate condition credential under the responsible observer's authority. Data collectors contribute provenance; collection alone does not confer professional authority. |
| Holder / authorised presenter | Stores and presents credentials and chooses among disclosures enabled at issuance. Possession is neither proof of ownership of the property nor permission to rely on the valuation. |
| Verifier | Checks the presentation, relevant signatures, authority, status, dates, claim rules and relationships against named inputs. Reports established facts and unresolved checks without converting them into legal permission. |
| Recipient / lender | Supplies its own trust and acceptance policy, checks the engagement and intended use, and makes the acceptance or credit decision. A sender-supplied policy cannot stand in for the recipient's policy. |

### Visual structure of one credential

```mermaid
flowchart TB
  POLICY["Recipient policy, terms,<br/>reliance and PI assessment"] -.->|outside the credential| VC


  subgraph VC["<br/>V-PC-001 
  Property Valuation Credential"]
    direction TB
    CLAIMS["Property, engagement<br/>and opinion"]
    REPORT["Inspection and<br/>report digest"]
    CARRIER["Signature, status and<br/>disclosure commitments"]
    CLAIMS ~~~ REPORT ~~~ CARRIER
  end

  VC -->|evidence_refs| PCC["C-PC-001<br/>Property Condition Credential"]
  PCC --> OBS["Separately signed<br/>observation and findings"]

  class VC rwGroup
  class CLAIMS,REPORT,CARRIER rwOutline
  class PCC rwSolid
  class OBS,POLICY rwMuted
  class POLICY,CLAIMS,REPORT,CARRIER,PCC,OBS rwEven

  click POLICY href "engagement-and-reliance.html"
  click CLAIMS href "#property-and-engagement"
  click REPORT href "#v-a1-report-digest-and-condition-reference"
  click CARRIER href "#claims-are-not-the-signed-sd-jwt"
  click PCC href "../condition/property-condition-credential.html"
  click OBS href "../condition/property-condition-credential.html"
```

Reading order: source signs claims; a holder presents evidence; the verifier reports checks; the recipient decides. Separate signatures preserve the boundary between valuation and condition responsibility. [^2][^6]

## Claims: field reference

The current :3 schema requires 15 top-level members. The table follows the decoded V-A1 fixture. Nested requirements and cross-field rules remain governed by the pinned claims schema; example values below are not a complete vocabulary. [^3][^7]

| Field | Meaning and example |
| --- | --- |
| `vct` | Required. Exact credential type: **urn:realworld:credential:property-valuation:3**. |
| `credential_id` | Required. Logical record identifier, e.g. val-p4-a-2026-000101. Distinguish it from a signed carrier instance identifier. |
| `profile_edition` | Required. The fixture records **0.4.0-draft**. This is not the credential type or the claims schema identifier. |
| `issuer` | Required. Claimed issuer identifier: <https://valuer-one.example.test>. Authority must be established separately. |
| `issued_at` | Required. Issuance timestamp, e.g. 2026-09-15T10:00:00Z. Not the effective valuation or inspection date. |
| `property` | Required. identifier contains scheme + value; jurisdiction supplies context. address_text is display information, not a substitute for property binding. |
| `engagement` | Required. engagement_id, addressee (scheme + value) and instruction_kind identify the professional instruction and intended addressee. |
| `valuation_purpose` | Required. Intended purpose; V-A1 uses secured_lending. The label does not itself authorise that use. |
| `basis_of_value` | Required. Basis for the opinion; V-A1 uses market_value. |
| `valuation_date` | Required. Effective date of the opinion; V-A1 uses 2026-09-14. The valuation-age clock runs from this date. |
| `valuation_conclusion` | Required. Opinion amount, e.g. `{"amount": 350000}`. Interpret it with currency and basis. |
| `currency` | Required. V-A1 uses GBP. Do not infer currency from address or jurisdiction. |
| `origin` | Required. Method and professional reference. V-A1 uses valuer_report and a synthetic valuer_reference; the latter is not proof of accreditation. |
| `inspection` | Required block. V-A1 uses mode internal and inspected_on 2026-09-14. The block must describe the actual inspection situation. |
| `report_digest` | Required. Algorithm + digest of the referenced valuation report. The report is not embedded in the credential. |

Optional composition used in the fixtures: evidence_refs links condition evidence. Do not add historical fields such as valuation_tier, a computed reliance object or jurisdiction_ext to :3 without schema support.

## JSON: valuation claims in context

These short JSON objects are exact member selections from `examples/claims/V-A1.json`. Together they illustrate the shape; each is a partial claim set, not a complete schema-valid credential and not a signed token. Every party and property value is synthetic. [^7]

### Identity and edition

```json
{
  "vct": "urn:realworld:credential:property-valuation:3",
  "credential_id": "val-p4-a-2026-000101",
  "profile_edition": "0.4.0-draft",
  "issuer": "https://valuer-one.example.test",
  "issued_at": "2026-09-15T10:00:00Z"
}
```

### Property and engagement

```json
{
  "property": {
    "identifier": {
      "scheme": "uprn",
      "value": "100000000001"
    },
    "jurisdiction": "GB-EAW",
    "address_text": "1 Synthetic Example Street"
  },
  "engagement": {
    "engagement_id": "eng-p4-a-000101",
    "addressee": {
      "scheme": "https_id",
      "value": "https://lender-a.example.test"
    },
    "instruction_kind": "original_instruction"
  }
}
```

### The opinion and its inspection anchor

```json
{
  "valuation_purpose": "secured_lending",
  "basis_of_value": "market_value",
  "valuation_date": "2026-09-14",
  "valuation_conclusion": {
    "amount": 350000
  },
  "currency": "GBP",
  "inspection": {
    "mode": "internal",
    "inspected_on": "2026-09-14"
  }
}
```

V-A1 was issued on 15 September; its opinion and inspection are dated 14 September. An issuance timestamp must not be displayed as a refreshed valuation date. The report digest and condition link are shown under [Condition evidence and report links](#condition-evidence-and-report-links).

## Claims are not the signed SD-JWT

The claim set is the semantic input. The binding adds a signed carrier, status reference and disclosure machinery. The compact presentation is a string containing an issuer-signed JWT, selected disclosures and, where used, a Key Binding JWT (KB-JWT). It is not the plain JSON in the claims examples. [^2][^7]

### Decoded header from the signed V-A1 fixture

```json
{
  "alg": "ES256",
  "typ": "dc+sd-jwt",
  "kid": "valuer-one-p4-demo-1"
}
```

### Selected decoded payload members from that same fixture

```json
{
  "iss": "https://valuer-one.example.test",
  "jti": "val-p4-a-2026-000101:instance:1789466400",
  "iat": 1789466400,
  "exp": 1824026400,
  "_sd_alg": "sha-256",
  "status": {
    "status_list": {
      "uri": "https://status.example.test/draft-list",
      "idx": 6
    }
  }
}
```

The fixture carries both semantic issuer/issued_at members and carrier iss/iat members. These are not interchangeable field names in the claims schema. jti identifies the carrier instance; credential_id identifies the logical record. exp limits the carrier and does not extend the age of the professional opinion.

### What verification has to establish

The verifier needs the signed bytes, verification key resolution and applicable authority evidence, not just a decoded payload. The recipient selects the accepted profile, issuer/key sources and algorithm policy; a key supplied with a credential does not establish its own authority. The verifier also processes disclosures, carrier validity, status and any required holder binding. A KB-JWT audience is a presentation binding; it is not the valuation's engagement addressee. Matching one does not establish the other. See [Verifier behaviour](../security/verifier-behaviour.md).

> **Fixture evidence, not a deployment claim**
>
> The displayed header and payload are decoded excerpts from the synthetic signed V-A1 example. The JSON excerpts omit the signature; decoding is not verification. Its reproducible test keys protect nothing and establish no real issuer identity or authority. Fixed demonstration nonces and clocks are not production security controls.

### Pinned binding references

X-BD-001 targets RFC 9901; SD-JWT VC draft-ietf-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-19; and Token Status List draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-21. Version upgrades require separate review. This binding establishes no OpenID4VC or HAIP alignment, and does not impose the historical draft's wallet-delivery protocols or universal trust directory.

## Selective disclosure and privacy

Selective disclosure lets a holder omit claims that the issuer made disclosable at issuance while retaining verifiable commitments to the disclosed values. It does not let the holder delete arbitrary cleartext claims. Selecting whole credentials for a presentation is a separate operation. [^2][^5]

| Scope | Current position |
| --- | --- |
| Implemented prototype | Only property.address_text can be selectively disclosed. Amount, engagement and other visible claims in the fixture are not made private merely by omitting address_text. |
| Intended cleartext design | Type, issuer, credential id, issue date, property identifier, valuation date, report digest and status reference support binding, timing and status checks. |
| Intended finer granularity | Address text; amount and currency; basis and purpose; valuer reference; inspection details; and individual evidence references. Beyond address_text this is design intent: not implemented or tested. |
| Recipient requirements | A withheld required claim leaves the relevant requirement unsatisfied. It is not evidence that the claim is false, absent, or acceptable. A hidden asset or evidence binding can prevent relationship verification. |

### The address disclosure in the actual signed fixture

Decoded property object from the issuer-signed payload; the JSON below is a payload excerpt, not a complete JWT.

```json
{
  "property": {
    "identifier": {
      "scheme": "uprn",
      "value": "100000000001"
    },
    "jurisdiction": "GB-EAW",
    "_sd": [
      "Y0oonVgXnOzX__FduprEq2qElwBYID4pG4osdc5-VAM"
    ]
  }
}
```

Decoded disclosure array from the same fixture: salt, claim name, value.

```json
[
  "q0KC4v2SnjF9girQU6dqsA",
  "address_text",
  "1 Synthetic Example Street"
]
```

The holder includes the encoded disclosure when revealing the address, and omits it when withholding the address. The verifier checks the disclosure against the signed digest. The raw address remains in the decoded claims fixture because that file represents the full claim set.

### What selective disclosure does not provide

Ordinary SD-JWT does not provide unlinkability or a predicate such as "value exceeds GBP 300,000" without revealing the amount. It does not establish package completeness, consent, access rights or secure transport, and it cannot retract information already received. Property identifiers and relationship metadata can still correlate presentations.

## Condition evidence and report links

A Property Condition Credential is signed separately by the responsible observer. The valuer can reference that record without copying its findings or becoming the author of the inspection. Reuse of the reference changes neither the observation nor its date. [^6][^7]

### V-A1 report digest and condition reference

Exact member selection from `V-A1.json`. The two digests identify different report artefacts; neither is a digest of the signed token bytes.

```json
{
  "report_digest": {
    "alg": "sha-256",
    "value": "5fce7add7ae1eb908133062923b493e61bfedffb129b0fc34d87d41d9ccb3088"
  },
  "evidence_refs": [
    {
      "vct": "urn:realworld:credential:property-condition:1",
      "issuer": "https://inspector-one.example.test",
      "credential_id": "cond-p4-2026-000301",
      "report_digest": {
        "alg": "sha-256",
        "value": "17e46b550eb0c4cdf93d35044988c66463a6d82b450ba40ce86345d79dd799ed"
      }
    }
  ]
}
```

### How the link is interpreted

The fixture identifies the condition instance by type, issuer, credential_id and report_digest. Link checking locates the referenced issuer/id and compares type, report digest and property identifier. The referenced credential still needs its own signature, authority, status and currentness assessment. A matching tuple is not enough to approve the inspection for the recipient's use.

The valuation report digest binds the valuation to a report artefact; the condition report digest binds the condition record to its report artefact. Possession of either digest neither supplies the report nor authorises its delivery. Report access and permitted use remain separate.

### Limits of the current link

This tuple survives a technical re-sign, but it is not a commitment to the complete condition claim set. Complete relationship integrity remains unresolved in the prototype, so a successful reference check must not be described as verification of every linked finding. A proposed claims_revision extension is not supported inside :3 and must not be inserted into these examples.

A newer condition record does not automatically rewrite or supersede a valuation that referenced an earlier observation. The recipient needs to consider the newer evidence under its policy. The current example can still report technical satisfaction for the valuation link; that is a stated limit, not proof that the dependency remains suitable.

Condition findings, ratings and limitations belong to the condition credential, not this valuation claim set.

## Technical re-signing

A technical re-sign keeps the same credential_id and the same substantive claims and produces new signature bytes. Valuation and inspection dates stay unchanged. Re-signing grants no new reliance and refreshes no evidence age. [^4]

## Status, freshness and recipient acceptance

### Status of an individual credential

The draft binding includes `status.status_list` with a `uri` and `idx` (see [Claims are not the signed SD-JWT](#claims-are-not-the-signed-sd-jwt)). At use, the verifier must assess the status source and its freshness under the binding and recipient policy. An unavailable or stale response is not evidence of good standing. Revocation or suspension must not be presented as a finding of usable current evidence; handling follows the binding and policy. Supersession is separately scoped and must not be inferred from reuse. Issuance follows the valuation date. Carrier validity, source status and evidence age answer different questions. [^2][^3]

| Question | Anchor / boundary |
| --- | --- |
| Is this carrier usable now? | Signature, key/issuer context, validity and applicable holder binding. Carrier exp is not a fresh valuation date. |
| What is its status now? | The applicable signed status information and the time it was observed. Refreshing this information does not refresh the underlying opinion. |
| Has this record been replaced? | Scoped supersession evidence for the same issuer, asset and engagement. |
| Is the opinion recent enough? | valuation_date, measured against the recipient's valuation-age limit. |
| Is the inspection recent enough? | inspection.inspected_on, measured independently. A desktop record without an inspection date cannot establish an inspection-age requirement. |
| Is linked condition evidence recent enough? | The condition credential's observation.observed_on. It is a separate clock; the existing Part III checker cannot configure a separate condition-age limit. |

### Acceptance remains the recipient's decision

A lender assesses the right property, issuer authority, disclosed claims, intended purpose, valuation basis, dates, engagement addressee, any required condition evidence and external terms. Legal reliance and professional indemnity insurance cover must be assessed separately. Neither a technical aggregate result nor a status-list entry establishes them.

> **Known addressee gap**
>
> The current Part III example can pass when the recipient differs from the engagement addressee. The draft policy overlay proposes addressee_not_recipient, but that overlay is not adopted. A successful KB-JWT audience check does not close this engagement gap.

Likewise, the current example can pass without a declared condition link even when recipient policy requires one. Absence of evidence_refs is not evidence that no inspection exists, and a successful link check is not a finding that the evidence set is complete.

Do not collapse specification readiness, source status, verification outcomes and institutional acceptance into a single "verified" badge.

## Relationship to OPDA and PDTF

Open Asset Evidence builds on the property-data work of the Open Property Data Association (OPDA) and the Property Data Trust Framework (PDTF) as an **independent, attributed extension**. V-PC-001 adds an explicit source-signed valuation statement with provenance, dates, engagement and evidence links. It does not replace the upstream property-data definitions. [^8]

### What is mapped, and what is not

| Upstream reference | Relationship and limit |
| --- | --- |
| propertyPack.uprn | OAE carries the identifier as property.identifier with scheme uprn. This does not prove that the identifier was allocated or matches the intended property. |
| valuations array | PDTF holds valuation records including capital value, timestamp, id, instruction type, context and valuation type. V-PC-001 represents one signed valuation; the mapping is partial. |
| Valuation semantics | The referenced source structure does not establish currency, basis of value, purpose or effective instant for this mapping. Free-text instruction/context/type fields cannot be treated as equivalent enumerations without a defined transformation. |
| Engagement and condition | The comparison does not establish how PDTF models separately signed engagement, reliance or condition documents. No complete adapter or end-to-end exchange is demonstrated. |

The current documentation pins the PDTF schemas to commit `996a56adc297e762bbee935a9ae2883df791e1d4`. Mapping statements apply to that reference, not every later revision or implementation. Repository schema material is MIT licensed; source attribution and applicable notices must be preserved, and referenced forms may have separate terms.

> **No external approval is implied**
>
> This extension has no demonstrated endorsement, certification, adoption or acceptance by OPDA, PDTF or their participants. Naming a framework, organisation or sandbox does not establish a partnership, deployed integration or recipient acceptance.

### Carrier and exchange protocols are separate

SD-JWT VC describes the selected credential carrier. OpenID issuance and presentation protocols are a related exchange layer. A working schema or signed synthetic fixture does not establish a tested OpenID4VCI, OpenID4VP or HAIP integration. No such compatibility or production readiness is claimed here.

### Reference pages

[PDTF UPRN reference](../references/pdtf-uprn.md)<br>[PDTF valuation reference](../references/pdtf-valuations.md)<br>[Standards and ecosystem](../guides/ecosystem-map.md)

## Implementation status and related rules

The :3 shape, claims schema and signed synthetic fixtures exist. The type remains draft and NOT_OFFERED pending legal review. The worked example and subsequent internal, model-assisted evaluation provide evidence about specific reference versions. Independent human assurance, complete reproducibility and institutional acceptance are not established. See [Assurance and release](../security/assurance-and-release.md). [^3][^7]

| Area | Evidence and unresolved limit |
| --- | --- |
| Claims and signed examples | Synthetic examples and internal tests illustrate specific behaviour. A matching expected result or a high pass count does not establish complete enforcement; tests must demonstrate the intended control with valid and invalid inputs. |
| Result checker | The Verification Result Contract checker checks the consistency of reported results, not credential signatures. Tests of that checker do not establish cryptographic verification or carrier interoperability. |
| End-to-end security | Independent signature, key-control, audience, nonce, status and adversarial testing against the pinned binding remains incomplete. |
| Professional semantics | Restricted-use reports and a no-reinspection assumption cannot yet be expressed in :3. A credential does not grant reliance, establish PI cover or prove accreditation. |
| Disclosure and links | Only address_text is selectively disclosable in the prototype. Element-level disclosure, complete relationship integrity and independent condition-age policy remain incomplete. |
| Other open checks | Date validation, recipient-context enforcement and mutation-test coverage remain incomplete. A technical success must not be described as recipient acceptance. |

### Related documentation

[V-ER-001 Engagement and Reliance](../valuation/engagement-and-reliance.md)

[C-PC-001 Property Condition Credential](../condition/property-condition-credential.md)

[X-BD-001 SD-JWT VC Binding](../shared/sd-jwt-vc-binding.md)

[X-PD-001 Evidence Presentation and Disclosure](../shared/evidence-presentation-and-disclosure.md)

[Verification Result Contract](../shared/verification-result-contract.md)

[Security, trust and responsibilities](../security/trust-and-responsibilities.md)

[^1]: [W3C Verifiable Credentials Data Model v2.0](https://www.w3.org/TR/vc-data-model-2.0/) supplies the general VC ecosystem concepts. This does not assert W3C JSON-LD conformance for this carrier.

[^2]: [X-BD-001 SD-JWT VC Binding](../shared/sd-jwt-vc-binding.md) and [RFC 9901](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9901.html). The binding pins SD-JWT VC draft 19 and Token Status List draft 21.

[^3]: [X-AP-001 Common Asset Evidence Profile](../shared/common-asset-evidence-profile.md) and the current property valuation draft.

[^4]: [V-ER-001 Engagement and Reliance](engagement-and-reliance.md).

[^5]: [X-PD-001 Evidence Presentation and Disclosure](../shared/evidence-presentation-and-disclosure.md).

[^6]: [C-PC-001 Property Condition Credential](../condition/property-condition-credential.md).

[^7]: The JSON selections use the synthetic V-A1 claims fixture and the signed V-A1 example. Every party is synthetic. These examples and their original checks were authored by the same team; they do not establish independent security assurance or institutional acceptance. Their structure remains tied to the draft identifiers on this page.

[^8]: [PDTF UPRN reference](../references/pdtf-uprn.md), [PDTF valuation reference](../references/pdtf-valuations.md) and [Standards and ecosystem](../guides/ecosystem-map.md). Source schemas: [Property-Data-Trust-Framework/schemas at the pinned revision](https://github.com/Property-Data-Trust-Framework/schemas/tree/996a56adc297e762bbee935a9ae2883df791e1d4).
