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Verifier behaviour

Design guidance. This page describes the proposed behaviour of a verifier for Open Asset Evidence. It does not establish that a particular service implements these checks or is ready for production. Read the assurance and release status for that distinction.

A signature check establishes that signed content matches a signature under the verification key. Identifying the issuer, establishing its authority and deciding whether to use the evidence require additional checks. A signature does not establish that an observation or valuation is factually correct.

Inputs the recipient controls

The proposed verifier separates three input groups:

  • Presented evidence: Source: Holder or presenting party. Purpose: Credentials, disclosed claims and supporting references to check.
  • Trust and status information: Source: Sources accepted under the recipient's policy. Purpose: Authenticated issuer, key, authority and status information, with its scope and freshness.
  • Recipient context: Source: The recipient. Purpose: Expected asset, intended purpose, policy version, acceptable freshness and presentation context.

Evidence supplied by a presenter must not weaken the recipient's requirements. A public key or address embedded in a credential is not, by itself, an authenticated link to an issuer. Key resolution needs the recipient's accepted trust inputs.

A result with separate checks

The proposed Verification Result Contract separates the following questions:

  • L1_parse: Can this format, type and version be interpreted?
  • L2_signature: Are the signature and issuer identity established, and are applicable presentation-binding checks satisfied?
  • L3_authority: Is the issuer recognised for this statement and scope?
  • L4_status: Are validity and credential status acceptable at the time of checking?
  • L5_semantics: Does the evidence refer to the expected asset, engagement and related records?
  • L6_policy: Does the presented evidence satisfy the recipient's purpose and requirements?
  • L7_acceptance: Has the recipient recorded its own decision?

Technical ALLOW requires the first six layers to be PASS. Missing, stale, unavailable and unsupported checks retain their stated outcomes. A required check that cannot be completed prevents technical ALLOW; insufficient evidence is distinct from an invalid signature or a contradiction. Other result producers leave the recipient's acceptance NOT_ASSESSED.

A result should identify the evidence presented, policy used, time checked and limits on reuse. It should expose the individual checks rather than rely on a single unqualified “verified” label. The current reference result checker checks the consistency of a reported result; it does not verify credential signatures or demonstrate a complete verifier.

Freshness and disclosure

Offline verification depends on the trust and status information available locally. A cached record supports a currentness check only within the recipient's accepted freshness limits. An unavailable status source is different from a revoked credential, but it does not supply a passing status check. A presenter cannot extend an acceptable age by declaring a longer limit.

Selective disclosure limits what is shared. Withholding a required claim may prevent a check from completing. A valuation and a separately signed condition record each need their own checks; a reference between them does not authenticate either record by itself.

Technical verification does not grant legal reliance, professional indemnity cover or institutional acceptance. Those boundaries are explained in Trust and responsibilities.