X-BD-001 SD-JWT VC Binding¶
This binding describes how Open Asset Evidence claims are serialised, signed and selectively disclosed as SD-JWT VC credentials. Claim meaning belongs to the profile that defines the claim. Carrier conformance is a separate target from conformance to an asset, condition or valuation profile.
Issuance and presentation¶
The issuer's signing service takes profile claims, issuer keys and a status reference and produces a credential. A holder presents it; a verifier parses and checks the presentation. The issuer chooses which claims can be selectively disclosed. A holder cannot later hide a cleartext signed claim by deleting it.
Use the Evidence Presentation and Disclosure rules for credential selection, claim disclosure and relationship checks. SD-JWT handles disclosure within a credential. It does not prove that a selected package is complete or that separately issued credentials have the relationship claimed by a manifest.
A property valuation uses vct to identify its credential type. Making the amount and basis selectively disclosable is a possible profile design, not a capability demonstrated by the current reference prototype: that prototype supports selective disclosure only for address_text. Full granular disclosure remains implementation work. If an asset reference is cleartext, every presentation exposes it; if a future profile makes it disclosable, withholding it can make asset binding unverifiable. Neither choice removes the need for recipient policy and privacy design.
Pinned specifications¶
The draft binding targets:
- SD-JWT, RFC 9901.
- SD-JWT VC, draft-ietf-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-19.
- Token Status List, draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-21.
Use these explicit versions and review upgrades separately. Preserve wire identifiers such as vct values exactly when display names or documentation codes change. No OpenID4VC or HAIP alignment is established by this binding.
Verification limits¶
The draft requires the verifier to apply the recipient's accepted binding, algorithms, credential types and key-resolution policy. A header's alg, typ or key reference is input to validate, not permission to select an arbitrary verification method. A credential-supplied JWKS address, embedded key or x5c certificate chain does not establish issuer identity by itself; the key must be authenticated through an accepted source or trust anchor. These are requirements, not a claim about every demonstration implementation. See Verifier behaviour.
Type metadata does not establish issuer authority. Check authority under the recipient's named trust policy, and apply the common profile rules for identifiers, time and status. A signature authenticates a statement; it does not establish the truth of an observation, legal effect or institutional acceptance.
The binding has prototype self-tests. End-to-end signature, key-control, audience, nonce, status and adversarial vectors against the pinned versions remain incomplete. The Verification Result Contract checker validates consistency of reported results rather than credential signatures. Its tests therefore do not establish working interoperability for this binding.